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ABSTRACT
This paper argues that vice-charging, the practice of charging other 
persons with epistemic vice, can itself be epistemically vicious. It identifies 
some potential vices of vice-charging and identifies knowledge of other 
people as a type of knowledge that is obstructed by epistemically vicious 
attributions of epistemic vice. The hazards of vice-charging are illustrated 
by reference to the accusation that parents who hesitate to give their 
children the MMR triple vaccine are guilty of gullibility and dogmatism. 
Ethnographic and sociological research is used to make the case that 
this charge is, in a significant range of cases, epistemically unjust and 
hinders attempts to make sense of vaccine hesitancy. This epistemic 
injustice consists in the representation of vaccine hesitant parents as 
less than full epistemic agents. A case is made for a more tolerant and 
inclusive approach, not only to vaccine hesitancy but also to other forms 
of unorthodoxy or non-compliance. The primary objective in these cases 
should be to achieve Verstehen of seemingly alien outlooks and practices 
so that policy makers and practitioners in public services can more 
effectively educate a sceptical public about the risks of vaccine 
hesitancy.
1. The hazards of vice-charging
Epistemic vices are blameworthy or otherwise reprehensible attitudes, character traits or ways 
of thinking that systematically obstruct the gaining, keeping or sharing of knowledge.1 Such 
vices include arrogance, closed-mindedness, dogmatism, gullibility and wishful thinking. 
Vice-charging is defined by Ian James Kidd as ‘the critical practice of charging other persons 
with epistemic vice’ (2016, p. 181). As Kidd notes, vice-charging is a striking feature of everyday 
social life.2 Most of us are only too willing to attribute epistemic vices to other people, while 
failing to acknowledge our own epistemic vices. Vice-charging is partly evaluative: to describe 
someone as gullible or dogmatic is to evaluate them, and the implied evaluation is negative. 
Vice-charging is also usually intended as explanatory. We often explain what we regard as the 
defective epistemic conduct of other people by reference to their supposed epistemic vices. 
For example, the flawed thinking and planning in the run-up to the 2003 American invasion 
of Iraq might plausibly be explained by reference to the epistemic and other vices of senior 
members of the Bush administration.3
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In other cases, explanatory vice attributions are much less straightforward. As Kidd observes, 
critically legitimate vice-charging is difficult in practice, not least because ‘we often see vice 
where none exists’ (2016, p. 186). This is one of the many hazards of vice-charging, and reflec-
tion on these hazards helps to focus our attention on the possibility that vice-charging can 
itself be epistemically vicious.4 There are several potential vices of vice-charging, and it is 
important to understand how epistemically vicious attributions of epistemic vices to other 
people can itself be an obstacle to knowledge. The knowledge that epistemically vicious 
vice-charging obstructs includes knowledge of other people. As well as reducing our ability to 
make sense of other people, this type of vice-charging is epistemically unjust in many cases. 
Seeing vice where none exists can be a form of epistemic injustice, and epistemic injustice is 
one of the epistemic vices of epistemically vicious vice-charging.
The discussion that follows is divided into three parts. Part 2 will give an account of when 
and how vice-charging goes wrong. Specifically, the focus will be on the different ways in which 
vice-charging can be epistemically vicious. Part 3 will consist of a detailed case study of prob-
lematic vice-charging. When parents do not respond as expected to public health messages 
about vaccinating their children, there is a tendency to explain this at least in part by reference 
to their gullibility and dogmatism.5 This is an example of explanatory vice-charging: explaining 
flawed thinking and decision-making by refence to underlying epistemic vices, or intellectual 
failings like lack of understanding. However, consideration of so-called ‘vaccine hesitancy’ or 
‘vaccine anxiety’ from an ethnographic perspective results in a different and more complex 
explanatory story in which the role of epistemic vices is far from obvious. Even if vaccine hes-
itant parents are misguided, many of their epistemic practices are arguably virtuous rather than 
vicious. This is something that is obscured by vice explanations of their conduct. Part 4 will 
spell out the deleterious epistemic consequences of epistemically vicious vice charging.
One of the advantages of focussing on the case of real-world vaccine hesitancy is that it 
avoids the dangers of oversimplification that is inherent in overreliance on fictional examples. 
Philosophical discussion of epistemic injustice continues to be dominated by two fictional 
examples that were first used by Miranda Fricker in a 2007 monograph. One is from Harper 
Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird, and the other from Anthony Minghella’s screenplay of Patricia 
Highsmith’s The Talented Mr. Ripley. In neither example is there any doubt that certain characters 
are guilty of a type of prejudice that results in epistemic injustice. The question is whether 
these characters – Herbert Greenleaf in The Talented Mr. Ripley and the jury in To Kill a Mockingbird 
- are culpable for their epistemically vicious prejudices.6 However, if there is one thing that 
studies of vaccine hesitancy prove, it is that attributions of epistemic vice to individuals or 
groups of individuals in the real world are much less straightforward.
In Fricker’s influential terminology, an epistemic injustice is a ‘wrong done to someone specif-
ically in their capacity as a knower’ (2007, p. 1). Suppose that attributions of epistemic vice to 
some vaccine hesitant parents are defective in one of two ways: they see epistemic vice where 
none exists, or they exaggerate the role of parental epistemic vices in explaining their supposedly 
flawed epistemic conduct. Either way, the targets of defective vice-charging are the victims of a 
form epistemic injustice. It is less clear, however, that they have been wronged specifically in their 
capacity as knowers. This issue will be addressed in part 4, where a case will be made for what 
Mikkel Gerken describes as ‘a broader notion of epistemic injustice that is not articulated in terms 
of knowledge’ (2019, p. 2).7 The concluding paragraphs will consider the relevance of the frame-
work developed here for attempts to understand vaccine hesitancy in relation to COVID-19 vaccines.
2. Some vices of vice-charging
Suppose that X is the person to whom an epistemic vice V is attributed by Y. For example, Y 
accuses X of gullibility and justifies this attribution on the basis that only a gullible person 
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could believe some of the things that X believes. Suppose that X believes that the MMR vaccine 
causes autism. Since Y regards this belief as baseless, she hypothesises that X only has this 
belief (call it the belief that P) because he has been taken in by misinformation about the 
vaccine. The fact that X is taken in needs to be explained, and Y’s explanation is that X is 
gullible. This is a vice explanation X’s belief, an explanation of X’s belief that P by reference to 
one or more of X’s epistemic vices. One possibility is that X is gullible and believes that P 
because he is gullible. If this is how things are then Y’s explanatory vice attribution is correct. 
However, it is also possible that Y’s vice attribution is flawed and raises questions about Y’s 
own epistemic conduct in trying to explain X’s belief by reference to his supposed gullibility.
Although vice explanations are sometimes correct, those who seek such explanations of 
other people’s beliefs can be accused of myopia in some cases. Vice explanations potentially 
overlook alternative, non-vice explanations. For example, Y’s vice explanation of X’s belief that 
P says nothing about X’s reasons for believing that P, that is, the considerations that led X to 
hold the belief that P. Jonathan Dancy notes that ‘there is a wide range of things we think of 
as capable of giving answers to the question “Why did he do that”?’ (2000, p. 5). In the same 
way, there are many ways of answering the question ‘Why does he think that?’. It is one thing 
to identify the causes of X’s believing that P and another to identify his reasons for believing 
that P. Even if X’s reasons are not good ones, they are still X’s reasons, and we have not really 
understood X unless we have taken account of them. Furthermore, while X’s reasons might not 
seem like good ones from our point of view, they might be in much better shape given X’s 
background assumptions.
These complications draw attention to another potential difficulty with Y’s explanation of X’s 
belief that P by reference to X’s epistemic vices. Those who provide such explanations are 
sometimes, and perhaps often, guilty of oversimplification. The oversimplification consists in 
assuming that epistemic conduct that strikes one as defective can be satisfactorily explained 
by reference to one factor – the target’s epistemic vices – rather than a complex of interacting 
factors. What the vice-charger offers is a simple explanation in these cases, with the implication 
that the target’s beliefs would be the same as one’s own if only he or she were less epistem-
ically vicious. The reality is often (though not always) more complicated, even in cases where 
the target’s epistemic vices do play a role.
Furthermore, it is hard not to worry that Y’s confident attribution of gullibility to X as a 
means of explaining X’s belief that P significantly underestimates the difficulty of getting to 
the bottom of other people’s beliefs and epistemic conduct, especially in cases of fundamental 
disagreement. Vice-chargers perhaps assume that they have greater insight into the springs of 
human conduct than they actually have. This is a form of intellectual overconfidence that points 
to another hazard of vice-charging: attributing epistemic vices to other people can all too easily 
comes across as arrogant and sometimes is arrogant. In these cases, charging another person 
with being epistemically vicious can serve as an expression of a sense of one’s own intellectual 
superiority. In the imaginary dialogue between X and Y, one would not be surprised to discover 
that X finds Y’s accusation offensively arrogant and might retaliate by asking what gives her 
the right to accuse other people of being epistemically vicious.
Intellectual myopia, oversimplification, overconfidence and arrogance are all epistemic vices. They 
are also some of the epistemic vices of vice-charging. This is not to say that vice-charging is nec-
essarily epistemically vicious in these ways, only that those who engage in vice-charging need to 
take care not to lay themselves open to the charge of epistemically vicious vice-charging. This 
charge might conceivably be justified in the case of X and Y even if X is gullible and his gullibility 
plays some role in causing him to believe that P. If X is not gullible, and Y sees vice where there is 
none, then there is a straightforward sense in which Y’s vice charge against X is unjust. The injustice 
in this case is epistemic even if Y does not wrong X in his capacity as a knower. If X’s belief that 
the MMR vaccine causes autism is false – as it is - then X does not know that P. However, X might 
be wronged by Y’s vice-charge even if the injustice is not epistemic in Fricker’s sense.
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This abstract description of the potential vices of vice-charging will have greater force if it 
can be illustrated by a realistic example. The phenomenon of vaccine hesitancy is the ideal 
example for present purposes. Vaccine hesitancy can be understood as behavioural, attitudinal, 
or both. Behavioural vaccine hesitancy consists in what the European Centre for Disease 
Prevention and Control characterises as a ‘delay in acceptance or refusal of vaccines despite 
the availability of vaccination services’.8 It is natural to think of vaccine refusal as underpinned 
by the hesitator’s attitude towards vaccines. Attitudinal vaccine hesitancy has been defined as 
‘an attitude of ambivalence regarding vaccines’ (Goldenberg, 2021, p. 3).9 On this definition, 
outright hostility to vaccination is not vaccine hesitancy since hostility is not ambivalence. For 
present purposes, however, vaccine hesitancy can be understood as a hostile or ambivalent 
attitude towards vaccines, leading in some cases to vaccine refusal.
Prior to the development of vaccines that provide protection against Covid-19, vaccine hes-
itancy in relation to MMR was the most significant modern example of this phenomenon. 
However, research by Jennifer Reich, Melissa Leach and James Fairhead among others shows 
that explanations of vaccine hesitancy by reference to the gullibility, ignorance and dogmatism 
of resistant parents are well wide of the mark.10 not only are such explanations epistemically 
vicious, their debunking by Reich, Leach and Fairhead serves as a warning to those of us who 
are quick to resort to vice explanations of perspectives and practices that we regard as deeply 
misguided.11
3. Making sense of vaccine hesitancy
In an article published in the British Medical Journal in 1988, the Chair of the uK’s Joint Committee 
on Vaccination and Immunisation described the impending introduction of a combined vaccine 
against measles, mumps, and rubella (MMR) as a ‘big bang for vaccination’ (Badenoch, 1988, p. 
750). The vaccine was part of a Mass Childhood Immunisation Programme that was seen as 
one of the great success stories of modern health. The aim was to achieve the 95 per cent 
uptake of the MMR vaccine needed for herd immunity. However, in 1998 The Lancet published 
an early report of research by Dr Andrew Wakefield and his colleagues (Wakefield et al. 1998). 
The report, which was subsequently retracted, posited a causal link between the MMR vaccine 
and autism. While not claiming to prove a link, the report would have left readers with the 
strong impression that such a link existed.
Subsequent research found no evidence that the MMR vaccine causes autism, and the British 
Medical Journal described Wakefield’s original article positing such a link as fraudulent.12 In 2010, 
he was struck off the medical register by the General Medical Council, which found him guilty 
of serious professional misconduct. However, the damage to the MMR vaccination programme 
had already been done. By 2002, uptake of the vaccine had fallen below 85 per cent, and in 
some areas fell as low as 71 per cent. Wakefield is reported to be unrepentant and is now a 
major figure in the global anti-vaxxer movement. Experts are puzzled by the continuing impact 
of discredited research and the rise in anti-vaccine sentiment across the world. In MMR and 
Autism: What parents need to know, Michael Fitzpatrick comments: ‘We have to explain how it 
has come about that a significant section of middle-class opinion in particular has come to 
reject, or at least seriously question, immunisation, regarded by many as one of the great 
achievements of medical science’ (2004, p. xi).
The reference to class in this quotation is telling. Research in this area is often organised 
around the distinction between low-income and marginalised ‘passive defaulters’ and middle-class, 
well-educated, ‘active resisters’ (Fitzpatrick, 2004, p. 15). It is the behaviour of the latter that 
causes special consternation. It is assumed that they ought to know better, on account of their 
relatively elevated social status and level of education. In addition, active resisters have ‘tended 
to accept the principles of a healthy lifestyle – as recommended by the government – in matters 
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such as diet and exercise, smoking and drinking alcohol’ (Fitzpatrick, 2004, p. 16). It is therefore 
hypothesised that if the problem with active resisters is not lack of education then it must be 
some other intellectual or epistemic failing that accounts for their non-compliance. Gullibility 
and dogmatism are two epistemic vices that have been mentioned in this connection.
Blaming vaccine hesitancy on epistemic vices is part of a wider narrative that attributes the 
attitudes and behaviours of vaccine hesitant parents to a variety of cognitive or intellectual 
defects or deficits such as scientific illiteracy, cognitive bias and ‘anti-expertise and science 
denialism among members of the public’ (Goldenberg, 2021, p. 17). This is the so-called ‘deficit 
model’ of vaccine hesitancy. Explaining vaccine hesitancy by reference to the epistemic vices 
of hesitators is another version of the deficit model, assuming that epistemic vices are intel-
lectual or cognitive deficits. Goldenberg highlights the inadequacies of the deficit model as she 
understands it.13 The focus here is on the inadequacies of a version of the deficit model that 
tries to explain vaccine hesitancy by reference to epistemic vices like dogmatism and 
gullibility.14
On the issue of gullibility, much has been made of the extent to which anti-vaxxers use 
rumour to induce vaccine hesitancy among supposedly gullible parents. This explanation is used 
to explain vaccine hesitancy in first world and third world contexts. Leach and Fairhead note 
that a dominant theme in representations of vaccine hesitancy in Africa ‘invokes the notion of 
rumour, and its capacity to spread rapidly among African populations that are, in turn, imaged 
as rather unreflective and gullible’ (2007, p. 20). Regarding dogmatism, consider the following 
testimony at a congressional hearing on autism given by Karen Seroussi, the mother of a child 
with autism:
We are not stupid – we are educated, informed parents who have done thousands of hours of research 
into autism. We did not come here to be lectured to; we came here to be listened to. We are full of ideas 
that you must hear. We know what happened to our children. How dare you think that you will be able 
to tell us otherwise.15
In response, Fitzpatrick observes that the professional understanding of research scientists and 
clinicians is the product of extensive training and cannot be acquired from the internet. At 
best, parents can acquire familiarity with one small aspect of a subject which allows them to 
select information that supports their preconceived convictions. While this may well be effective 
for campaigning purposes, such a ‘narrow and selective approach can lead to the sort of dog-
matic outlook expressed by Karen Seroussi, which is inimical to scientific inquiry and discussion’ 
(Fitzpatrick, 2004, pp. 95–96).
While some may sympathise with this type of explanatory vice-charging, others will be put 
off by its tone of intellectual superiority. In any event, there is a more nuanced story to be told 
about the sources and epistemic standing of vaccine hesitancy. As Reich notes, ‘we live in an 
age of personalization’, in which ‘we see heightened efforts to personalise medical care to meet 
the desires and needs of the individual’ (2018, p. 11). Many parents engage in what Reich calls 
individualist parenting, ‘expending immense time and energy strategizing how to keep their 
children healthy’ (2018, p. 5). This model is inimical to a one-size fits all vaccination routine 
that, some parents argue, ‘may not be appropriate for their children’ (Reich, 2018, p. 11). Crucially, 
an individualist parenting philosophy ‘directly contradicts the goals of public health, which 
expects parents to absorb a measure of risk to their own children in order to protect others’ 
(Reich, 2018, p. 12).16
The epistemological implications of this parenting model are highlighted by Leach and 
Fairhead in their account of the child-centred and personalised parenting that is promoted by 
current parenting advice in Europe and America. As they note, ‘a new equation has come to 
be drawn between the good parent and the parent who, as the best expert on their own child, 
seeks to negotiate parenting advice with their child’s individual particularities’ (Leach & Fairhead, 
2007, p. 51). This ‘particularistic view of child health’ (Leach & Fairhead, 2007, p. 59) and the 
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‘particularistic thinking’ that underpins it ‘characterizes the ways that many parents now think 
about vaccination, evaluating the actual, or potential, effects of vaccination on their own child 
in relation to his or her particular strengths or vulnerabilities’ (Leach & Fairhead, 2007, p. 51). 
More to the point, the particularistic view of child health has epistemological consequences 
that bear on the question whether, when it results in vaccine hesitancy, this hesitancy is a 
consequence of parental epistemic vices.
Particularistic thinking is not a way of thinking about parenting that is, in and of itself, 
epistemically vicious.17 To the extent that every child is a unique individual, with his or her 
distinctive strengths and vulnerabilities, parents who tailor parenting advice to the needs of 
their own children are not epistemically vicious on that account. One might have thought that 
particularistic thinking about one’s own children promotes rather than obstructs knowledge of 
their individual needs and how best to meet them. The parenting advice given by health pro-
fessionals is, of necessity, coarse-grained, and it is for parents to develop a more fine-grained 
perspective on what is best for their own children. But what if this results in vaccine hesitancy? 
Research suggests that in deciding whether to consent to vaccines, parents first consider the 
likelihood that their children will encounter the disease and then assess how badly they would 
be affected if they were to get the disease.18 Since each child is seen as unique, very little 
account is taken of public health data about the risks for unvaccinated children. Tellingly, the 
parents in Reich’s study who did not consent to the MMR vaccine for their children did consent 
to the tetanus vaccine since the risks of tetanus seemed much more compelling.19
not vaccinating one’s own children against MMR has collective consequences, but a failure 
to be influenced by these consequences is an ethical rather than an epistemological flaw.20 
Children who are unvaccinated by parental choice are effectively free riders who benefit from 
others’ immunity. Free-riding is not, per se, epistemically vicious, however problematic it may 
be from an ethical standpoint. Of greater concern from an epistemological standpoint is the 
notion of parental expertise that is built into the particularist model. When it comes to their 
own children, parents view themselves as experts. As Reich puts it, ‘parents generally, and 
mothers specifically, are expected to be experts on their own children’ (2018, p. 68). They engage 
in a process of self-education to make informed decisions about their children’s health risks. 
They weigh information from books, websites, and physicians ‘alongside what they often see 
as their trump card: a sense of intuition about what they feel their children need’ (2018, p. 70). 
Yet it is arguable that parents overestimate their expertise and the reliability of their intuitions 
about their children’s needs.
Overestimating one’s expertise and ability to estimate the risks facing one’s children is epis-
temically vicious. However, talk of epistemic vice in this context needs to be weighed against 
the reality that, at least in the West, parents today are expected to be experts on their own 
children and to engage in personalised parenting. While it is important that ‘the limitations of 
parental experience and study are recognized’ (Fitzpatrick, 2004, p. 95), it is also important that 
parental expertise and study are not seen as worthless. There is a sense in which good parents 
do know their own children better than anyone else. They have information about their family 
history and vulnerabilities that play an important and legitimate role in decision-making about 
vaccinations. Parental intuition about the health status of one’s own children is not a complete 
myth. Furthermore, one consequence of individualist parenting is ‘a pronounced sense of per-
sonal responsibility, and assumption of personal blame, for any harm that might come to a 
child either through disease or through vaccination adverse effects (Leach & Fairhead, 2007, p. 
69). As Goldenberg points out, ‘while the safety of vaccines is sufficiently established for public 
health purposes, parents want to know if vaccines are safe for their kids’ (2021, p. 36). Since 
individualist parenting is both time- and resource-intensive, it should come as no surprise that 
children in the u.S. who are unvaccinated by parental choice are likely to be white, have a 
mother who is married and college-educated, and live in a household with an income over 
$75, 000.21
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Crucially for present purposes, personal responsibility is seen as a form of epistemic respon-
sibility. As Leach and Fairhead note, ‘the encouragement to research (or “look into it”) and then 
make up your mind is a pervasive theme in MMR talk, and in parents’ narratives about the 
process of deciding’ (2007, p. 65). Parents ‘describe the importance of conducting their own 
research, considering their own children’s needs, and making independent decisions, based on 
their own knowledge and intuition’ (Reich, 2018, p. 72). Yet, in other aspects of life, thinking 
for oneself and making independent decisions are generally regarded as epistemic virtues rather 
than vices. Kant claimed that, the motto of the Enlightenment is ‘have the courage to think for 
yourself’. The parents described by the studies cited here can lay a reasonable claim to abiding 
by this motto, at least as far as parenting is concerned.
none of this is to say that vaccine hesitant parents who decide not to vaccinate their parents 
are doing the ‘right’ thing for their children, although it should be clear by now that the notion 
of the ‘right’ thing for one’s children is far from straightforward. nor is it to suggest that the 
epistemic conduct of all vaccine hesitant parents is epistemically virtuous. Apart from concerns 
about parents’ overconfidence in their own expertise, there is also the issue of whether having 
the courage to think for oneself is epistemically virtuous in contexts in which one lacks the 
background knowledge that is necessary for one to be an effective independent thinker. Insisting 
on thinking for oneself rather that deferring to people with greater knowledge and understand-
ing can be epistemologically disastrous, especially if one is deluded about the true extent of 
one’s own competence.22 nevertheless, if there is one thing to emerge from the work of Reich 
and Leach and Fairhead, it is that talk of intellectual virtues and vices is far too blunt an instru-
ment to make sense of the phenomenon of vaccine hesitancy. Vaccine hesitancy might be 
explicable by reference to parental epistemic vices in some cases but there is no good reason 
to suppose that vice explanations of vaccine hesitancy are appropriate in all, or even in most, 
cases. The reality is much more complicated, and vice explanations fail to do justice to this 
complexity.
Where does this leave attempts to explain vaccine hesitancy by reference to parental gullibility 
and dogmatism? In principle, there are two separate issues here. The first is whether the epis-
temic conduct of vaccine hesitant parents justifies the attribution to them of the vices of gullibility 
and dogmatism. The second is whether, even if these are among the epistemic vices of some 
vaccine hesitant parents, their vaccine hesitancy is best explained by reference to their gullibility 
and dogmatism. The latter question does not arise if vaccine hesitant parents are neither espe-
cially gullible nor especially dogmatic. However, if vice-charging in this case is unjustified, then 
we will need to face up to another question: if vaccine hesitant parents are not epistemically 
vicious, then how is it that they are misguided about the risks of vaccination (assuming that 
they are)?
understood as a character trait, gullibility is the tendency to be easily deceived or taken in. 
A gullible person is excessively trusting and lacking in proper scepticism. It cannot be said that 
vaccine hesitant parents are gullible in this sense. Far from being excessively trusting in general, 
they display a distinct lack of trust in public health advice and large pharmaceutical companies. 
They do not take what doctors tell them on trust, and their insistence on doing their own 
research indicates a degree of intellectual independence that is plainly incompatible with gull-
ibility. Gullible people are easily led. Vaccine hesitant parents are not. How, in that case, is their 
trust in alternative sources of information to be explained? Whether or not they are, in general, 
easily taken in, does their faith in the advice of people like Andrew Wakefield not suggest that 
they are easily deceived at least when it comes to the safety of vaccines? People who continue 
to insist that the MMR vaccine causes autism are peddling misinformation, and it might be 
argued that one would have to be gullible to be taken in by it.
There are several problems with arguing in this way. Given that vaccine hesitant parents are 
extremely sceptical about some sources of information, their supposed gullibility is highly 
selective and source-specific. However, if gullibility is a genuine character trait then one would 
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not expect it to be so selective. Instead of explaining vaccine hesitancy by reference to parent’s 
gullibility, it is more easily explained as a matter of judgement. Parents who believe Wakefield 
display poor judgement, but this does not necessarily point to a general character flaw like 
gullibility. Furthermore, it is not true that all vaccine hesitant parents are taken in by Wakefield 
or other alternative sources. Many describe themselves as confused by conflicting claims about 
the safety of vaccines, and their decision not to vaccinate might have more to do with a policy 
of erring on the side of caution rather than the belief that Wakefield is right. To blame vaccine 
hesitancy on a trait like gullibility is to overlook the complexity of the parental decision-making 
process in many cases. To see vaccine hesitant parents as gullible is to imply that they are 
being manipulated rather than making up their own minds about what to do, but Reich’s study 
in particular does not support this interpretation.
Dogmatism can be defined as an unwillingness to engage seriously with alternatives to 
beliefs one already holds.23 Many of the vaccine hesitant parents described by Reich were not 
committed to any specific view about the MMR vaccine prior to having children. At this point, 
they had no beliefs about vaccine safety. Hence, the question whether they were willing to 
engage seriously with alternatives to their beliefs about vaccine safety does not arise. Suppose, 
next, that some parents concluded, on the basis of their own research and contrary to the 
advice of their child’s paediatrician, that the MMR vaccine is unsafe. The charge of dogmatism 
is still problematic since parents in this category continued to spend time engaging with the 
official view. Since they were under pressure to follow the standard advice about vaccine safety, 
they devoted considerable time and energy to the task of justifying their refusal to accept the 
official view. Of necessity, this meant engaging with the official view, if only to debunk it. This 
is not the behaviour of a person who is unwilling to engage seriously with alternatives to beliefs 
she already holds.24
The real basis of the charge of dogmatism is not that parents who decide not to vaccinate 
their children are unwilling to engage with the official view but that they reject it. In other 
words, having made up their minds, they stick to their guns, regardless of the official advice. 
However, the mere fact that one refuses to change one’s mind does not make one a dogmatist. 
It all depends on whether one is willing to consider alternative perspectives. If, after studying 
the official advice, one concludes that it is misguided, one might be accused of coming to the 
wrong conclusion. However, it is one thing to come to the wrong conclusion about something 
and another for one’s thinking to be dogmatic. The charge of dogmatism is well wide of the 
mark in many cases of vaccine hesitancy given the seriousness with which parents take the 
task of finding out what is best for their children in the light of conflicting advice.
Gullibility and dogmatism are not the only epistemic vices. In an influential discussion, Linda 
Zagzebski gives the following examples of what she calls intellectual vices: ‘intellectual pride, 
negligence, idleness, cowardice, conformity, carelessness, rigidity, prejudice, wishful thinking, 
closed-mindedness, insensitivity to detail, obtuseness and lack of thoroughness’ (1996, p. 152). 
After reading Reich and Leach and Fairhead, can one really say, hand on heart, that the parents 
they describe display many, if any, of the vices on this list? These parents are far from idle or 
careless or conformist. Many are impressively thorough in their research and go into consider-
able detail even if they overestimate their ability to understand the science. The possibility that 
they display other epistemic vices cannot be ruled out, but perhaps enough has been said to 
cast doubt on attempts to explain their views about vaccine safety by reference to their sup-
posed epistemic vices. If they are epistemically vicious, one suspects that they are no more so 
than the average person.
Apart from the danger of seeing vice where none exists, there is a more general issue with 
vice explanations of vaccine hesitancy. These explanations tend to be individualistic, but ‘vaccina-
tion is quintessentially social’ (Leach & Fairhead, 2007, p. 163). While institutions and groups can 
be epistemically vicious, the epistemic vices that figure in vice explanations of vaccine hesitancy 
tend to be personal failings and to indicate defects in individual thinking. However, ‘vaccination 
EDuCATIOnAL PHILOSOPHY AnD THEORY 9
is not something that parents only think about for themselves, or speak about with health pro-
fessionals. When considering vaccination, parents interact with a much wider social world. Of 
particular importance are discussions with other parents’ (Leach & Fairhead, 2007, p. 61). To the 
extent that vice explanations ignore the social dimension of thinking and decision-making about 
vaccine safety, they are arguably misguided in principle.
There remains the question how to explain the fact that many vaccine hesitant parents end 
up believing falsehoods about vaccine safety if their thinking is not only not epistemically 
vicious but also, as I have been arguing, epistemically virtuous in certain respects. How can 
epistemic virtue lead to error? It is a familiar point that one can do one’s best, epistemically 
speaking, and still end up with false beliefs. Such beliefs might even be epistemically justified. 
Being epistemically justified is one thing for a belief, being true is another. In hostile environ-
ments in which misinformation is in wide circulation, even a careful and conscientious inquirer 
might end up with false beliefs, but this is entirely consistent with carefulness and conscien-
tiousness being epistemic virtue rather than vices. Epistemic virtues such as those displayed 
by some vaccine hesitant parents do not always result in truth or accuracy. What makes them 
virtues is that they are generally beneficial, epistemically speaking, as indeed they are.
A more radical response to the suggestion that the epistemic virtues of vaccine hesitant 
parents lead them to error would be to dispute the imputation of parental error. The supposed 
error consists in believing falsehoods about vaccine safety. The pertinent falsehoods concern 
the riskiness of vaccines. In essence, population-level studies of adverse side effects indicate 
that vaccines are much less risky than parents believe. However, this is not how parents think 
about risk. As noted above, the issue for many hesitant parents is not whether vaccines are 
safe at a population level but whether they are safe for their child in relation to his or her 
particular strengths or vulnerabilities. This question cannot be settled by quoting population-level 
figures. Parents worry about unknown or unknowable factors that may affect their child in 
particular, and are not reassured by being told that adverse events are very rare.25 There may 
be all sorts of reasons for judging that parents who think in this way are somehow missing 
the point but it is at least not obvious that they are missing the point as they see it or that 
their beliefs about the safety of vaccines in relation to their own children are straightforwardly 
false. The attribution of error in these cases can be as problematic as the attribution of epis-
temic vice.
4. Vice charging and epistemic injustice
What are the epistemic consequences of epistemically vicious attributions of epistemic vice? 
One consequence is that such attributions make it harder for us to know or understand other 
people. The type of understanding that epistemically vicious vice-charging obstructs is Verstehen. 
To acquire Verstehen of another human being is to be able to see things from their point of 
view, in terms of their reasons and categories of thought. Verstehen requires empathy rather 
than a rush to judgement. In the social sciences, it consists in the attempt to understand social 
phenomena “from within”, that is, ‘from the point of view of the social agent’ (Martin, 2000, p. 3). 
In psychology, it consists in the attempt to understand other minds from within. It is an exercise 
in sensemaking, the project of making sense of another person’s take on the world, especially 
when that take is very different from one’s own.26
Vice attributions and vice explanations do not offer a ‘from within’ understanding of another 
person. They are external judgements about a person’s defects rather than an attempt to grasp 
their reasons ‘from the inside’. Verstehen requires a willingness to engage with another person’s 
subjectivity. Dismissing vaccine hesitant parents as dogmatic and gullible does not do that. Far 
from delivering anything recognisable as Verstehen, it obstructs it. It results in what José Medina 
calls ‘insensitivity’, that is, ‘being cognitively and affectively numbed to the lives of others: being 
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inattentive to and unconcerned by their experiences, problems, and aspirations; and being 
unable to connect with them and to understand their speech and action’ (Medina, 2013, p. xi). 
Once one explains another person’s beliefs by reference to their epistemic vices, there is little 
incentive to cultivate sensitivity or to dig deeper and seek a more nuanced and sympathetic 
understanding of their speech and action. To attribute other people’s thinking to their epistemic 
vices makes it all too easy not to take them seriously as active epistemic agents who are capable 
of making up their own minds about complex matters. To ascribe their vaccine hesitancy to 
gullibility is effectively to deny them epistemic agency, and instead represent them as passively 
absorbing misinformation. This denial of agency is what the potential epistemic injustice of 
vice-charging consists in.
If we are serious about understand vaccine hesitancy, and developing counterstrategies, we 
need to take seriously the observation that vaccine hesitant parents have their own reasons, 
and that they cannot be properly understood without understanding the reasons for which 
they do what they do. In Constantine Sandis’ terminology, an agential reason is ‘any consider-
ation upon which one actually acts or refrains from doing so’ (2015, p. 267). If the aim is to 
grasp the considerations upon which some vaccine hesitant parents refrain from giving their 
children the MMR vaccine, what is the best way of unpacking these reasons in a way that does 
justice to their complexity and the social dimension of decision-making about vaccines? A 
sociological or ethnographic perspective is much more likely than vice-charging to deliver 
Verstehen in this context.
From an ethnographic perspective, ‘a major aim is to rescue and bring to light parental 
framings, and to show how they make sense in their particular contexts’ (Leach & Fairhead, 
2007, p. 10). Informal conversation in social settings where parents take their babies and small 
children, as well as structured interviews with parents and health professionals, played a key 
role in Leach and Fairhead’s research. To avoid recycling stereotypes, they began by looking at 
parents’ broader perspectives on raising a healthy child in a specific social setting. Their study 
was an exercise in sensemaking and engaging with the subjectivities of vaccine hesitant parents. 
In a different context, the sociologist Arlie Russell Hochschild used a similar method to arrive 
at an understanding of people on the right of American politics who voted for Trump. The 
result was her much praised book Strangers in Their Own Land: Anger and Mourning on the 
American Right.27 As with ethnographic studies of vaccine resistance, the objective was Verstehen.
Some may feel that this approach threatens a pernicious relativism, with the implication that 
the views of the people studied by Reich, Leach and Fairhead, and Hochschild are just as valid 
as those of their mainstream critics. There is also the question of how far sensemaking can or 
should go. Are there not people whose views put them beyond the pale and beyond the limits 
of legitimate sensemaking? Sensemaking implies a degree of respect for one’s subject but are 
there not subjects who, on account of their bizarre views, are not worthy of this kind of respect? 
These are important questions which cannot properly be tackled here. However, while such 
concerns might be legitimate in some contexts, the idea that vaccine hesitant parents are 
beyond the pale or not worthy of respect is itself beyond the pale. The great merit of the more 
tolerant and inclusive approach recommended here is that it serves as a barrier against elitist 
condescension.
It was suggested above that seeing epistemic vice where none exists, or exaggerating the 
role of parental epistemic vices in explaining their supposedly flawed epistemic conduct in 
relation to vaccinations, are forms of epistemic injustice. An epistemic injustice in Fricker’s sense 
is a wrong done to someone specifically in their capacity as a knower. A central form of epis-
temic injustice is testimonial injustice. A speaker ‘suffers a testimonial injustice just if prejudice 
on the hearer’s part causes him to give the speaker less credibility than he would otherwise 
have given’ (2007, p. 4). One specific type of prejudice is identity prejudice. This is Fricker’s label 
for ‘prejudices against people qua social type’ (2007, p. 4). Testimonial injustices can be system-
atic or incidental. The former are produced ‘not by prejudice simpliciter, but specifically by those 
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prejudices that track the subject through different dimensions of social activity’ (Fricker, 2007, 
p. 27). If a subject is ‘wrongfully excluded from the community of trusted informants’, this means 
that ‘he is unable to be a participant in the sharing of knowledge’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 132). He is 
‘demoted from subject to object, relegated from the role of active epistemic agent’ (Fricker, 
2007, p. 132). This leads Fricker to conclude that the intrinsic harm of testimonial injustice is 
epistemic objectification: ‘when a hearer undermines a speaker in her capacity as a giver of 
knowledge, the speaker is epistemically objectified’ (Fricker, 2007, p. 133).
How much of this framework is applicable to vice-charging of vaccine hesitant parents? When 
vaccine hesitant parents who opt not to vaccinate their children are wrongly accused of epis-
temic vices like dogmatism and gullibility, they are not victims of testimonial injustice to the 
extent that they are not in the business of testifying in the philosophical sense. They are not 
necessarily telling anyone else anything but simply making up their own minds about what to 
do, based on their own research and conversations with other parents. If they are victims of 
prejudice, the prejudice at issue here is not identity prejudice unless one is prepared to regard 
‘vaccine hesitant’ as a social type. nor is it the kind of prejudice that tracks white, educated, 
predominantly middle-class targets through different dimensions of social activity.
Despite this, the ethnographic and sociological studies cited here do suggest that the 
vice-charging of vaccine hesitant parents is, in at least in some cases, unjust. The challenge is 
to capture the relevant form of injustice. To say that they are wronged specifically in their 
capacity as knowers is to concede a point that one might not wish to concede: that these 
parents have genuine knowledge to impart. The present case is very different from the ones 
discussed by Fricker. It is not in question that Marge Sherwood and Tom Robinson are in pos-
session of valuable pieces of knowledge. However, to see some vaccine hesitant parents as 
victims of epistemic injustice, it is not necessary to think that they know everything they claim 
to know. If their beliefs about the safety of the MMR vaccine are assumed to be false, then 
these beliefs do not constitute knowledge. In that sense, these parents are not wronged in 
their capacity as knowers, even though it is not in dispute that they know their own children.
Other critics have pointed to the limitations of Fricker’s characterisation of epistemic injustice 
in terms of knowledge. Gerken notes that ‘someone who is warranted in believing that p but 
insufficiently warranted to know that p can also suffer epistemic injustice’ (2019, p. 2). There 
are cases in which a subject is wronged ‘specifically in her capacity as an epistemic subject’ 
(Gerken, 2019, p. 2) without being wronged specifically in her capacity as a knower. It is debat-
able in these cases whether being wronged qua subject amounts to being demoted from subject 
to object. Gaile Pohlhaus Jr. notes that this description does not even fit Fricker’s own examples. 
Marge and Tom are both ‘perceived as subjects’ (2014, p. 104) by their interlocutors. The problem 
is that they are treated as less than full epistemic subjects, where this consists in ‘being relegated 
to the role of epistemic other, being treated as though the range of one’s subject capacities is merely 
derivative of another’s’ (Pohlhaus Jr., 2014, p. 107).
Is this the sense in which some vaccine hesitant parents are wronged by accusations of 
gullibility and dogmatism? There is something to be said for this view, especially when vaccine 
hesitancy is attributed to a gullible response to misinformation or peer pressure. To see vaccine 
hesitant parents as tricked or manipulated into doubting the advice of health professionals is 
to see them as passive epistemic victims rather than as active subjects making up their own 
minds. The sense in which their capacities are viewed as merely derivative of another’s is that 
they are deemed to have simply taken on board, without independent critical reflection, 
anti-vaccination propaganda. Describing such parents as being relegated to the role of the 
epistemic other is going too far but they are certainly relegated from the role of active epis-
temic agent. This is the clearest sense in which their treatment is epistemically unjust. The 
reality is not that these parents are too passive but that they are hyper-active in their opposition 
to ‘passive acceptance of established, normal public-health routines’ (Leach & Fairhead, 2007, 
p. 3). They talk to one another but ‘little sense emerges of anything resembling peer pressure 
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to vaccinate or not’ (Leach & Fairhead, 2007, p. 63). The only peer pressure they face is the 
pressure to do their own research and make up their own minds rather than blindly accept 
the official guidance.
It is always possible to take the view that all this talk of making up one’s own mind is a 
form of false consciousness, and that the reality of parental decision-making is at variance with 
the self-image of vaccine sceptics. However, if they are not genuinely making up their own 
minds, then should the same not be said of the many parents who accept unquestioningly the 
official guidance to vaccinate? Yet the latter parents are not accused of being epistemically 
vicious on account of their compliance. It is only non-compliant parents who are charged with 
epistemic vice. This points to the biggest pitfall of vice-charging, the ever-present temptation 
to see epistemic vice every time one encounters a group of non-conformists whose views or 
conduct are fundamentally different from one’s own. Sometimes, the vices one sees are real 
but not always. However, given the biased nature of vice-charging - the fact that we are far 
more likely to engage in vice-charging of people whose views are different from our own than 
those who agree with us – it is worth giving serious consideration to a policy of sensemaking 
rather than vice-charging. From an educational perspective sensemaking is indispensable: public 
health officials who wish to educate a sceptical public about the benefits of getting themselves 
or their children vaccinated would be well advised to start by trying to comprehend the far 
from straightforward and not necessarily disreputable sources of vaccine hesitancy.
Before bringing the discussion to a close, there is one more question to consider: what is 
the relevance of the framework developed here for attempts to understand vaccine hesitancy 
in relation to COVID-19 vaccines? The discussion so far has focussed on the specific case of the 
MMR vaccine, but is COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy any different? The exact extent of such hesi-
tancy is still not clear. However, surveys indicate that a significant proportion of registered 
voters in America do not intend to take a COVID-19 vaccine.28 The main issue here is whether 
adults will vaccinate themselves, not whether they will vaccinate their children. This is one 
important difference between COVID-19 and MMR vaccine hesitancy. The question remains, 
however, whether vice explanations of COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy are any more plausible than 
parallel explanations of MMR vaccine hesitancy.
Preliminary ethnographic research suggests that so-called ‘COVID-19 no-vaxxers’ are, in many 
cases, not overall anti-vaxxers.29 Their concerns are specifically about the COVID-19 vaccine in 
its various forms. Some are ‘motivated to distrust public-health authorities who they’ve decided 
are a bunch of phoney neurotics, and they’re motivated to see the vaccine as a risky pharma-
ceutical experiment, rather than as a clear breakthrough that might restore normal life’ 
(Thompson, 2021). Others worry about unknown long-term side effects. In this connection, an 
article in The Atlantic quotes one African American as saying ‘The fact that there is no way [for 
me] to sue the government or the pharmaceutical company if I have any adverse reactions is 
highly problematic to me’.30 Scepticism about vaccines is also linked to libertarian concerns 
about government-imposed lockdowns in response to the COVID-19 pandemic and the impact 
of lockdowns on individuals who are already economically marginalised.
While it is conceivable that epistemically vicious thinking is at the root of some of these 
concerns, it is not obvious that it is at the root of all of them.31 People have a variety of reasons 
for not getting vaccinated, and some are better than others. In this case, there is also a signif-
icant political dimension. Some individuals are vaccine hesitant because they believe conspiracy 
theories about COVID-19. These conspiracy theories are related to a range of other conspiracy 
theories.32 To the extent that conspiracy thinking is epistemically vicious, this points to a vice 
explanation of some COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy but there are also hesitators who are not 
conspiracy theorists.33 It is also important to distinguish between producers and consumers of 
conspiracy theories.34 Ahmed notes that ‘the key protagonists in the ‘anti-vaxx industry’ are a 
coherent group of professional propagandists’ who run ‘multi-million-dollar organisations, incor-
porated mainly in the uSA, with as many as 60 staff each’ (2021, p. 366). To explain the anti-vaxx 
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activities of such propagandists in terms of their epistemic vices is to miss the point. All the 
indications are that their motives are political or financial and that these are the terms in which 
their activities are best explained and understood.35
While research into COVID-19 vaccine hesitancy is still in its infancy, the discussion so far 
suggests the following: people have many different reasons for being COVID-19 vaccine hesitant, 
and it is not possible to make sense of their vaccine hesitancy without engaging in detail with 
their reasons and trying to understand why they strike some people as good reasons. A will-
ingness to engage with the subjectivity of hesitators is essential, and vice explanations seem 
much more likely to obstruct than to facilitate Verstehen. The title of The Atlantic article cited 
above is ‘Millions Are Saying no to the Vaccines. What Are They Thinking?’. As well as being 
fundamental, this question also has the merit of conceding that the people concerned are 
thinking. When it comes to any form of vaccine hesitancy, this is as good a place as any to 
start.36
Disclosure statement
no potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes
 1. In the terminology of Cassam (2019a), this is an ‘obstructivist’ account of epistemic vice. Two other influ-
ential accounts of epistemic vice are ‘reliabilism’ and ‘responsibilism’. Reliabilist vices are personal or 
sub-personal cognitive faculties or processes that produce a preponderance of false beliefs. Responsibilist 
vices are character traits that involve bad motives. See Battaly (2014) for more on the contrast between 
reliabilism and responsibilism.
 2. ‘We complain often and easily about arrogant celebrities, dogmatic politicians, greedy bankers, and cruel 
tyrants’ (Kidd, 2016, p. 181).
 3. This is the diagnosis offered in chapter 1 of Cassam (2019a).
 4. I have done my share of vice-charging. See Cassam (2016, 2019a). Mea culpa, though I would like to think 
that at least some of my charges are not epistemically vicious.
 5. See, for example, Fitzpatrick (2004).
 6. Fricker thinks that the jury is culpable in a way that Greenleaf is not.
 7. See, also, Pohlhaus (2014) on this issue.
 8. Vaccine hesitancy (europa.eu)
 9. Most of my work on this paper was done before the publication of Goldenberg (2021). She sees vaccine 
hesitancy as a reflection of ‘poor public trust in science and the health professionals’ (Goldenberg, 2021, 
p. 18). My account highlights other aspects of vaccine hesitancy but is consistent with Goldenberg’s per-
spective. I have only been able to take limited account of Goldenberg’s useful discussion.
 10. Leach and Fairhead (2007); Reich (2018).
 11. Another, much older, study in a similar vein is Rogers and Pilgrim (1994). In opposition to the assumption 
that non-compliant parents are irrational or driven by neurotic anxiety, their research into what they call 
‘rational’ non-compliance starts with the assumption that parents’ non-compliance ‘is based on an informed 
rationale’ (Rogers & Pilgrim, 1994, pp. 1–2).
 12. Wakefield’s article linking MMR vaccine and autism was fraudulent | The BMJ.
 13. Goldenberg (2021).
 14. Goldenberg mentions epistemic vices in passing. See Goldenberg (2021, p. 30). There is a case for treating 
the cognitive biases she mentions as epistemic vices. See Cassam (2019a, pp. 24–27).
 15. Cited by Michael Fitzpatrick. See Fitzpatrick (2004, p. 94). There is some reason to think that this reference 
should be to Karyn rather than Karen Seroussi. Karyn Seroussi is the author of a book on childhood autism. 
See Seroussi (2000).
 16. See, also, Goldenberg (2021, pp. 31–33).
 17. See Cassam (2018) for an exposition and defence of particularism in a different context.
 18. Reich (2018, pp. 75–76).
 19. See Pru Hobson-West (2003) for a persuasive account of parental attitudes to risk and uncertainty. As she 
notes, parents tend to think in terms of uncertainty rather than population-level risk. Some parents express 
concerns about the long-term evolutionary consequences for human health of using vaccines derived from 
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animal tissue. Such unknowable unknowns ‘would clearly be difficult to factor in, no matter how much 
risk assessment is carried out’ (Hobson-West, 2003, p. 279). See, also, Goldenberg (2021, p. 34).
 20. For further discussion of the ethical issues, see the conclusion to Reich (2018).
 21. Reich (2018, p. 14). Rogers and Pilgrim describe many of the parents in their study as ‘probably paragons 
of virtue for positive health promotion for their children (1994, p. 20), except in relation to the issue of 
immunisation.
 22. As Hardwig puts it, ‘because the layman is the epistemic inferior of the expert (in matters in which the 
expert is expert), rationality sometimes consists in refusing to think for oneself’ (1985, p. 336).
 23. This is the account of dogmatism given in Battaly (2018).
 24. It is also worth noting that in Rogers and Pilgrim’s study, ‘it was generally the case that dissenting parents 
began as compliers with the traditional medical regimens and became non-compliers over time’ (1994, p. 
14). Past compliance ‘was regretted because of a lack of thought about the issue’ (Rogers & Pilgrim, 1994, 
p. 16), and eventual non-compliance ‘was associated with an informed and active choice’ (Rogers & Pilgrim, 
1994, p. 17). Reflecting on past immunisation decisions, ‘it was as if information and critical reflection had 
given them insight, which they lacked in the past and others currently lack’ (Rogers & Pilgrim, 1994, p. 
17).
 25. Hobson-West (2003); Goldenberg (2021, p. 34).
 26. See Weick (1995) for more on sensemaking.
 27. Hochschild (2016).
 28. Civiqs | Coronavirus: Vaccination
 29. Thompson (2021).
 30. Thompson (2021).
 31. Epistemically vicious thinking is described and discussed in Cassam (2019a, chapter 3).
 32. Ahmed (2021).
 33. The extent to which conspiracy thinking is epistemically vicious is also controversial.
 34. See Cassam (2019b) on the significance of the distinction between conspiracy theory producers and con-
sumers.
 35. This applies to conspiracy theories more generally, as argued in Cassam (2019b).
 36. I thank Deborah Ghate and two referees for extremely helpful comments on an earlier draft of this essay.
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